Q. In the present time, one successful revolution of the Islamic movements was brought about in Iran under the leadership of Imam Khomeini. Is it not so that the parliamentary electoral policy adopted by Maulana Mawdudi in the 1957 flopped in the 1970 elections? This is in contrast to Khomeini’s approach who realized his targets in shorter period?

This comparison is not realistic. No doubt, the movement followed by Khomeini was more popular and people had much larger contribution in it. Yet, it is clear that the struggle was not of a nature where you construct something brick-by-brick. It was more like a tide and an upheaval, which if brought at the proper time, can be used for errecting a structure, but with a slight mistake, can also work for destruction and turn on its standard-bearers. Together with the situation created by the Pehlavi monarchy and an Iran under the American influence, what we must remember is that Shia school was and is, a strong organized force with its centre of allegiance and guidance at ‘Qum’. The organizational network emanating and independently controlled from ‘Qum’ is very deep- rooted, integrated and free from government influence. It commands not only religious, but economic power as well.

Secondly, the revolution has a psychology. Study it closely and you will find that harsher the suppression and regimentation, equally strong will be the reaction. Seen in the background of this psychology of revolution, Iran provides a unique situation. The coercion, cruelty, dictatorship and the awesome intelligence system were employed to such an extent and people were arrested and families destroyed on such a mass scale that suffocation and hatred against the whole system reached their extremes. Under the conditions, Imam Khomeini acted at the most appropriate time. He had the necessary machinery and instruments which he timely employed.

In this respect, the American attitude has been quite strange. To begin with, America provided all means to build Shah’s strength, so that together with Israel, Iran could help realize American political, strategic and economic interests in the region. For undertaking this service, the Iranian monarch received full price to strengthen his rule. Soon, the Shah started expanding his navy, air force and ground forces and equipped them with sophisticated modern weaponry, so that he could independently act as a regional power. For the purpose, he also contacted Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and others. America got alerted by these gradually emerging intentions. Then unlike its overlooking attitude as in the past, America started raising the issue of "basic human rights". During Shah’s visit to America, this factor was at work behind the scene. Remember, that this said American strategy was not to bring Imam Khomeini to power. It was only to pressurise and snub the Shah to submit to American dictates and at last pave way to an Iranian military coup. But the violent wave of revolution under the leadershdip of Khomeini washed away not only the Shah’s throne, but the supporting anchor of American interests was also smashed. In other words, pressing the Shah through the media projection of Khomeini’s movement was part of the American policy, but not to bring Khomeini to power. Anyhow, it is clear that the result was against the American expectations. During the movement against Shah, the role played by the French media to globalize the revolution cannot be over-looked.

These factors which created the situation for revolution, will have to be kept in view. This was a unique case. The action and reaction of these factors as happened in Iran during 1978-79, are not existing in Pakistan. So comparing our situation with others and to conclude that such and such approach succeeded or failed, is not only emotional in nature, but incorrect by way of theory and practice.

As far as the approach decided in the Machi Goth conference of the Jama’at is concerned, ^* it is being followed by the Jama’at todate. It is not so that the policy failed during the 1970 elections and we went for some other approach after 1985. The strategy is the same; that we need to work in four major areas:

(i) Conceptual and ideological call;

(ii) Moral reforms and organization;

(iii) Re-building the society on moral foundations; and

(iv) Reformation of the political system and struggle to bring forth new leadership. ^.

All these activities are integrated and inter-dependent. To the extent we succeed in the first three areas (ideology, organization, Islamization of society), simultaneous actions will be needed to move forward in the political sphere. One major factor of failure during the 1970 elections was that the Islamic forces were divided. Together they got substantial votes, yet could not form collective political force. Another factor is that the 1965-70 period of Pakistan’s political life has been very sensitive. In that period certain bigotries erupted like a tempest that carried with it regionalism, and for economic reasons, the social hatred and class struggle.